CompTIA N10-009 Practice Test 51
Question 500
Administrators access device web consoles remotely over an untrusted segment and require protection of credentials in transit. Which THREE entries correctly identify the applicable control, its technical principle, and a direct validation observation? (Select THREE.)
- Encrypted authenticated sessions protect management secrets from transit interception.
- Encrypt backup data at rest with controlled key access.
- Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.
- Use HTTP or Telnet without encryption because the segment is called internal.
- Captures show protected sessions and management plaintext ports are unavailable.
- Enforce HTTPS or SSH with trusted cryptography and disable plaintext management.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Correct principle. Encrypted authenticated sessions protect management secrets from transit interception. This is the justification for the selected network control: Enforce HTTPS or SSH with trusted cryptography and disable plaintext management.
E:Correct validation. Captures show protected sessions and management plaintext ports are unavailable. This is the directly measurable result of the control.
F:Correct control. Encrypted authenticated sessions protect management secrets from transit interception. It is the recommended implementation for this case.
Incorrect Answers
B:This belongs to the changed condition, not the current three-part answer: Configuration backups stored on disk must also remain confidential. Storage confidentiality is different from encrypted data in transit.
C:This is another scenario's control in the same domain: Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings. It is not the best action for this case.
D:This control is invalid here. Network location does not guarantee confidentiality against local interception. It does not meet the specified requirement.
Question 501
A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?
- Issue and manage internal PKI certificates with distributed trusted roots.
- Use an appropriate TACACS+ integration with command authorization and accounting.
- Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity.
- Validate the TLS certificate path, hostname, expiration and revocation where applicable.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Trust chains bind a public key to an authorized identity when validation succeeds. This specifically resolves: A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root.
Incorrect Answers
A:This action responds to a later condition: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA. Private PKI can support trust when clients explicitly trust the issuing authority.
B:This addresses another problem in objective 4.1: A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches.
C:Unverified self-signed certificates cannot establish external server identity alone. The suggested approach is: Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity.
Question 502
A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root. A colleague instead suggests: Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity. Which finding MOST specifically explains why that suggestion is unsuitable?
- Trust chains bind a public key to an authorized identity when validation succeeds.
- Unverified self-signed certificates cannot establish external server identity alone.
- Private PKI can support trust when clients explicitly trust the issuing authority.
- DNS lookup does not authenticate or authorize administrative operations.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Unverified self-signed certificates cannot establish external server identity alone. This flaw directly concerns the proposed action: Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity.
Incorrect Answers
A:This explains why the recommended control works: Validate the TLS certificate path, hostname, expiration and revocation where applicable.
C:This rationale belongs to a later changed condition: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA.
D:This flaw concerns a different case in objective 4.1: A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches. The current rejected proposal is: Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity.
Question 503
A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root. After applying the solution 'Validate the TLS certificate path, hostname, expiration and revocation where applicable.', which observation MOST directly proves that the requirement was met?
- Audit records show per-user permitted and denied commands on managed devices.
- Approval is recorded for 'Validate the TLS certificate path, hostname, expiration and revocation where applicable.' but no operational validation is performed.
- A trusted service handshake succeeds and a wrong-hostname certificate fails.
- Access logs reconcile with approved personnel and rack tamper events.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A trusted service handshake succeeds and a wrong-hostname certificate fails. It tests the intended outcome because trust chains bind a public key to an authorized identity when validation succeeds.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation is for a different condition: A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches. It does not directly test the target outcome: A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root.
B:The missing direct test is: A trusted service handshake succeeds and a wrong-hostname certificate fails.
D:This test addresses a separate problem: An office needs a physical deterrent against unauthorized access to a wiring closet with network core equipment.
Question 504
The original case was: A network service must prove its public certificate chains to an approved organizational root. The requirement then changes: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA. Which revised action BEST meets this new condition?
- A trusted service handshake succeeds and a wrong-hostname certificate fails.
- Issue and manage internal PKI certificates with distributed trusted roots.
- Trust every self-signed certificate received from any host without checking identity.
- Validate the TLS certificate path, hostname, expiration and revocation where applicable.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Private PKI can support trust when clients explicitly trust the issuing authority. The revised requirement is: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA. The appropriate action is: Issue and manage internal PKI certificates with distributed trusted roots.
Incorrect Answers
A:A trusted service handshake succeeds and a wrong-hostname certificate fails. The current requirement is: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA.
C:Unverified self-signed certificates cannot establish external server identity alone. It remains inappropriate in the revised context.
D:This is the original control. Trust chains bind a public key to an authorized identity when validation succeeds. It does not directly satisfy the revised requirement: The organization deploys a private internal service with its own controlled root CA.
Question 505
Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?
- Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.
- Install a controlled lock and access logging with appropriate surveillance.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA or approved high-assurance factors.
- Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Accountability and least privilege require identifiable users and scoped rights. This specifically resolves: Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings.
Incorrect Answers
B:This addresses another problem in objective 4.1: An office needs a physical deterrent against unauthorized access to a wiring closet with network core equipment.
C:This action responds to a later condition: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords. Authentication strength addresses compromised credentials separately from authorization scope.
D:Shared identities prevent reliable user attribution and complicate revocation. The suggested approach is: Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action.
Question 506
Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings. A colleague instead suggests: Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action. Which finding MOST specifically explains why that suggestion is unsuitable?
- Logical credentials do not prevent unplugging or hardware theft.
- Accountability and least privilege require identifiable users and scoped rights.
- Shared identities prevent reliable user attribution and complicate revocation.
- Authentication strength addresses compromised credentials separately from authorization scope.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Shared identities prevent reliable user attribution and complicate revocation. This flaw directly concerns the proposed action: Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action.
Incorrect Answers
A:This flaw concerns a different case in objective 4.1: An office needs a physical deterrent against unauthorized access to a wiring closet with network core equipment. The current rejected proposal is: Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action.
B:This explains why the recommended control works: Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.
D:This rationale belongs to a later changed condition: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords.
Question 507
Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings. After applying the solution 'Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.', which observation MOST directly proves that the requirement was met?
- Access logs reconcile with approved personnel and rack tamper events.
- Change logs identify the approving administrator and denied unauthorized actions.
- An authorized review verifies isolated payment paths and scoped control evidence.
- Approval is recorded for 'Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.' but no operational validation is performed.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Change logs identify the approving administrator and denied unauthorized actions. It tests the intended outcome because accountability and least privilege require identifiable users and scoped rights.
Incorrect Answers
A:This observation is for a different condition: An office needs a physical deterrent against unauthorized access to a wiring closet with network core equipment. It does not directly test the target outcome: Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings.
C:This test addresses a separate problem: A regulatory program requires payment network systems to remain isolated and their operational scope documented.
D:The missing direct test is: Change logs identify the approving administrator and denied unauthorized actions.
Question 508
The original case was: Switch administrators use one shared local account and cannot determine who changed privileged settings. The requirement then changes: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords. Which revised action BEST meets this new condition?
- Use individual identities with role-based authorization and attributable audit logs.
- Change logs identify the approving administrator and denied unauthorized actions.
- Continue using one shared superuser password for every administrative action.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA or approved high-assurance factors.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Authentication strength addresses compromised credentials separately from authorization scope. The revised requirement is: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords. The appropriate action is: Require phishing-resistant MFA or approved high-assurance factors.
Incorrect Answers
A:This is the original control. Accountability and least privilege require identifiable users and scoped rights. It does not directly satisfy the revised requirement: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords.
B:Change logs identify the approving administrator and denied unauthorized actions. The current requirement is: Administrators need stronger login protection against stolen passwords.
C:Shared identities prevent reliable user attribution and complicate revocation. It remains inappropriate in the revised context.
Question 509
A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches. Which action MOST directly meets the stated networking requirement?
- Use 802.1X with a supported RADIUS back end and admission policy.
- Use an appropriate TACACS+ integration with command authorization and accounting.
- Segment payment-system networks and map applicable PCI DSS control obligations.
- Use DNS A records as the sole substitute for administrator privilege evaluation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:TACACS+ commonly supports granular network-device administrative command controls. This specifically resolves: A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches.
Incorrect Answers
A:This action responds to a later condition: The organization needs network access authentication for end-user wired devices. Endpoint network admission differs from administrator command authorization.
C:This addresses another problem in objective 4.1: A regulatory program requires payment network systems to remain isolated and their operational scope documented.
D:DNS lookup does not authenticate or authorize administrative operations. The suggested approach is: Use DNS A records as the sole substitute for administrator privilege evaluation.
Question 510
A network team needs centralized administrator authentication and command authorization for switches. A colleague instead suggests: Use DNS A records as the sole substitute for administrator privilege evaluation. Which finding MOST specifically explains why that suggestion is unsuitable?
- TACACS+ commonly supports granular network-device administrative command controls.
- DNS lookup does not authenticate or authorize administrative operations.
- Encryption alone does not satisfy segmentation, monitoring and access obligations.
- Endpoint network admission differs from administrator command authorization.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:DNS lookup does not authenticate or authorize administrative operations. This flaw directly concerns the proposed action: Use DNS A records as the sole substitute for administrator privilege evaluation.
Incorrect Answers
A:This explains why the recommended control works: Use an appropriate TACACS+ integration with command authorization and accounting.
C:This flaw concerns a different case in objective 4.1: A regulatory program requires payment network systems to remain isolated and their operational scope documented. The current rejected proposal is: Use DNS A records as the sole substitute for administrator privilege evaluation.
D:This rationale belongs to a later changed condition: The organization needs network access authentication for end-user wired devices.