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A precise delegated contract controls relevance and supports objective verification of the subtask result. This is not a substitute for “Deduplicate equivalent subtask requests before spawning another agent”; that control is necessary in the stated circumstances. A coordinator should control redundant delegation to conserve time and prevent divergent answers to identical work.

Tight tool permissions are important for safe delegation, but they cannot identify when two authorized assignments ask the same question and consume the same context. Check stable task inputs and pending work IDs before spawning another agent, and reuse or reconcile a verified existing result instead.

Selective context passing keeps important evidence without consuming the subagent's budget on irrelevant history. The direct remedy is “Deduplicate equivalent subtask requests before spawning another agent”, which the alternative does not itself accomplish. A coordinator should control redundant delegation to conserve time and prevent divergent answers to identical work.

A delegate needs a clear contract for its autonomous work. This alternative does not establish how to correlate asynchronous specialist responses correctly in the stated workflow.

Programmatic definitions provide runtime-scoped configuration and can override file-defined agents with the same name. It would leave the stated need to correlate asynchronous specialist responses correctly unresolved.

Filtering references by requester authorization is an access-control requirement, but it cannot correlate two authorized research results that arrive in the opposite order. Each result should include its stable task ID and producing subagent identity. Keep both safeguards, while recognizing that access filtering alone does not solve result attribution.

A time-limited exception records an intentional bypass, but the requirement is to enforce scanning for normal releases. An exception mechanism is not a substitute for the scan gate and could weaken it if applied to every deployment. The deploy service should require a recorded successful scan unless a separately authorized exception explicitly applies.

External event delivery can be at least once. That addresses a different part of the system, not the requirement to enforce workflow ordering outside of model discretion.

A verified approval callback authenticates a human decision, but the described defect is that deployments can run before scanning even when nobody is approving an exception. Encode the scan result as a required precondition on the deploy operation for the exact artifact version. Do not rely on an unrelated callback or prompt reminder.

A separate reviewer is only useful if the signing service enforces their actual decision. Merely naming an approver while permitting immediate signature does not create an approval gate. The execution boundary must check recorded authorization for the specific contract version and signer before dispatch.

Downstream stages must not infer success from a fluent sentence. It would leave the stated need to require explicit authorization at the sensitive handoff unresolved.

External validation provides a hard, repeatable check independent of the assistant's confidence. The decisive requirement here is to require explicit authorization at the sensitive handoff.

Segregating request and authorization roles prevents one compromised assistant from completing an unchecked financial transaction. This alternative does not establish how to codify mandatory sequencing as state transitions in the stated workflow.

A human approval token can gate a high-risk action, but the parse-validate-publish pipeline needs deterministic ordering on every run. Human approval by itself does not ensure that validation happened after parsing or before publication. Use workflow states with transitions permitted only when the previous stage succeeded.

Text instructions are probabilistic guidance. The scenario instead requires a way to codify mandatory sequencing as state transitions. A scan gate protects a particular deployment condition, but it does not implement the parse-validate-publish state machine for the data pipeline described. The relevant invariant spans all three named steps.

A typed success or failure field records the outcome of one operation, but a team handoff after several partial actions needs more than a status bit. The successor must know which operations were attempted or committed, which sources were consulted, and which failures are unresolved to avoid unsafe duplicate work.

Multi-step external operations are not automatically atomic. That addresses a different part of the system, not the requirement to preserve operational state at handoff boundaries.

Authenticating an approval callback is important when a workflow awaits human authorization, but this task is a handoff between teams after failed operations. The successor needs the exact attempted actions, source references, status and unresolved failures. An approval token alone cannot reconstruct the partial work or prevent duplicate retries.

A contract-signing approval would protect an authorization boundary, not validate whether deployment JSON conforms to its required schema. The model can sound confident while omitting required fields or returning invalid types. A deterministic validator should parse the artifact and reject malformed configuration before deployment.

Multi-step external operations are not automatically atomic. This alternative does not establish how to gate risky output on independent validation results in the stated workflow.

An approved exception governs when an otherwise required control may be bypassed. It cannot establish that generated deployment JSON meets a schema. Parse and validate the actual fields before deployment; treating self-reported validity as an exception would weaken the correctness gate.

A workflow state machine ensures permitted stage transitions, but the same duplicate webhook can start two separate, individually valid workflows. The failure occurs at initiation, before stage transitions help. Deduplicate by the event's stable identity so only one invoice run is created for the same provider event.

Reviewer identity and evidence-version records explain a human decision, but duplicate invoice runs result from repeated delivery of the same webhook event. The coordinator must use a durable event identity to prevent a second workflow from starting, even if no human review occurs.

Text instructions are probabilistic guidance. Although useful elsewhere, it is not the direct mechanism to deduplicate repeated workflow triggers. Checking a scan prerequisite would not deduplicate two identical webhook deliveries. Both invoices could satisfy a scan rule and still trigger duplicate processing without event-level idempotency.

A workflow should make missed deadlines visible and actionable. That addresses a different part of the system, not the requirement to require both recorded review passes before release.

A scan gate is an example of an enforceable prerequisite, but it specifically protects a deployment from missing security checks. This client report needs independent legal and fact-review results. The release gate should verify both approvals for the exact document version before delivery, not merely enforce an unrelated software scan.

A required data invariant is machine-testable. This capability does not directly require both recorded review passes before release. A populated case reference is a field-completeness check, not evidence the legal and factual reviewers approved the report. A valid schema can still contain unreviewed conclusions.

Human-in-the-loop governance is only auditable if overrides have durable attribution and supporting context. This alternative does not establish how to propagate machine-readable outcome states between stages in the stated workflow.

A workflow should make missed deadlines visible and actionable. Although useful elsewhere, it is not the direct mechanism to propagate machine-readable outcome states between stages.

Compensating actions help recover from partial writes, but they do not tell the next stage whether the current billing update succeeded. The downstream workflow needs an explicit success or error state with machine-checkable details. Without that status, it could trigger a second operation based on a fluent but false success message.

Recording override identity and reasoning supports audit of a decision after one exists. The current approval has remained unanswered for two business days, so there is no decision to record yet. A deadline-driven workflow needs timeout and escalation transitions to surface the pending request rather than wait forever.

Segregating request and authorization roles prevents one compromised assistant from completing an unchecked financial transaction. That addresses a different part of the system, not the requirement to handle unresolved approvals with deterministic timeouts.

Authenticating an approval callback protects a decision that has actually arrived. Here no approval has been received for two business days; callback validation cannot unstick the pending task. The workflow needs an explicit deadline, timeout state, notification, and authorized escalation path.