Question 290
A global storefront experiences repeated HTTP bot abuse and an architect attempts to attach an AWS WAF web ACL directly to a Network Load Balancer. Which observable outcome BEST establishes that the intended networking requirement is satisfied?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Malicious application requests are rejected at a supported edge integration while legitimate paths remain accessible. This outcome verifies the intended network behavior rather than merely showing a setting exists. WAF inspects supported HTTP(S) requests; it does not become a layer-four firewall merely by associating with a load balancer. Scenario: A global storefront experiences repeated HTTP bot abuse and an architect attempts to attach an AWS WAF web ACL directly to a Network Load Balancer.
Incorrect Answers
Distinct authorized representations remain isolated while unrelated parameters do not fragment cache hit ratios. That result supports CloudFront cache key and origin request policies but does not establish the requested networking outcome here. Instead verify: Malicious application requests are rejected at a supported edge integration while legitimate paths remain accessible. Scenario: A global storefront experiences repeated HTTP bot abuse and an architect attempts to attach an AWS WAF web ACL directly to a Network Load Balancer.
Eligible requests fail over to a healthy secondary origin without treating unsupported request methods as automatically retried. That result supports CloudFront origin groups and failover behavior but does not establish the requested networking outcome here. Instead verify: Malicious application requests are rejected at a supported edge integration while legitimate paths remain accessible. Scenario: A global storefront experiences repeated HTTP bot abuse and an architect attempts to attach an AWS WAF web ACL directly to a Network Load Balancer.
Approved overlapping-address consumers reach only the advertised service without full routing between their networks. That result supports AWS PrivateLink overlapping CIDR access but does not establish the requested networking outcome here. Instead verify: Malicious application requests are rejected at a supported edge integration while legitimate paths remain accessible. Scenario: A global storefront experiences repeated HTTP bot abuse and an architect attempts to attach an AWS WAF web ACL directly to a Network Load Balancer.


